Goldman Sachs is pulling Claude Code from its bankers and traders
TL;DR Highlight
Goldman limits coding agents to engineers, cutting off traders and bankers
Who Should Read
A developer in charge of AI adoption who is deciding whether to give coding agents like Claude Code to non-engineering staff
Core Mechanics
- Coding agents are now engineers-only
- Internal guidance updated in October restricts Claude Code and Microsoft's GitHub tools to the bank's engineers.
- Strats, who work across trading, quant research and software engineering, still have access.
- The in-house AI assistant, which uses models from several companies, remains available firm-wide.
- Client-flow monitoring work got cut
- Traders had used the tools to monitor client trading flows, model market moves and positions, and make written and graphic material.
- Some traders are frustrated, according to Bloomberg.
- The review looked at productivity and risk concerns.
- In July it was praised
- CIO Marco Argenti promoted "vibe coding" by non-technical staff in July.
- Traders and bankers built tools and passed them to about 12,000 engineers to improve.
- Agent code reaches work without review
- Claude Code reads files, writes programs and runs them, typically with the user's own access.
- Engineer code goes through review, testing and deployment controls, but a trader's script can reach daily use without them.
- Banks must keep information barriers between groups, and agent-built tools weren't designed with those in mind.
- Hong Kong restriction was location-based
- In April Goldman removed Claude from its internal AI platform for Hong Kong bankers.
- An Anthropic spokesperson said Claude had never been officially supported in Hong Kong.
- The new restriction is based on role, not location.
- Other banks go different ways
- Barclays said in October it expects half its developers to be using Claude Code by year end, then named developers among 5,000 job cuts.
- JPMorgan and Schwab are blocking outside agents from customer accounts.
Community Reactions
- Isolation is the core issue, one view says
- One commenter argued that running semi-unattended agents on finance staff's main machines mixes client and trade data, email, internet and internal network access.
- They said one small mistake or a prompt injection could cause a major leak.
- A commenter guessed it was an operational loss
- One commenter noted that only traders can send orders and book client trades.
- They argued an agent running under a trader's account with minimal review would eventually enter a bad order.
- Claude access clawed back over billing, one commenter says
- One commenter said their org is pulling back Claude access because of chronic billing overages.
- They said they're moving to Gemini, which has flat billing and throttles access to higher models.
- Excel macros became Claude artifacts, one comment says
- A commenter said the old obscure Excel macros are now Claude artifacts, with nothing improved.
- They said the pullbacks they've seen came from compliance or security checkboxes.
- Managed environments suggested as the alternative
- One commenter said the engineering team should design a programming environment where bankers can't hurt themselves.
- Another listed containers, egress filters, human in the loop and per-agent MCP controls as the safety side.
- One commenter said they saw a pattern where security says no, it's escalated and allowed, then about 1% of the time the model leaks data and it's locked down again.
- A note on sourcing
- One commenter pointed out the original source is Bloomberg and State of AI is a rewrite site.
How to Apply
- Tabulate agent permissions today
- List who in your company uses coding agents like Claude Code or Copilot, and their roles.
- In the same table, note the data, email, internal network and production accounts each can reach.
- Name an owning engineer for agent-built code
- Before a non-engineer's agent-built tool touches production data, name an engineer who owns it.
- Apply information barriers, data entitlements and software approval rules to agent-written code as well.
- Record what people used a tool for before pulling it
- Interview users about what they used the tool for before you revoke access.
- Hand the findings to the engineering team as a backlog for a replacement tool.
Try It
# Prompt to paste into Claude or ChatGPT (a simplified checklist version of the article's advice)
You are a security reviewer in a regulated financial environment. Below is a description of a tool that a non-engineer at our company built with a coding agent.
{{Tool description: what it does, data it uses, runtime environment, users}}
Answer in a table:
1. Which engineer should own this tool
2. Where it may violate information barriers, data entitlements or software approval rules
3. The worst-case scenario if it is used daily without code review and testing
4. Three controls needed before it touches production data
Next step: re-evaluate the same tool assuming it only runs in a sandbox (an isolated environment).Terminology
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