Agents' Overreliance on Unreliable Tools
TL;DR Highlight
Corrupting tool returns made all 14 tested agents adopt wrong values at high rates
Who Should Read
Backend developers running agents with web search, sub-agents or code executors who worry about what happens when a tool returns a wrong value
Core Mechanics
- Agents follow wrong tool outputs
- 14 models were given web search, an LLM sub-agent and a code executor with plausibly corrupted returns.
- Mean adoption exceeded one third for every tool and reached 68.0% for search.
- Corrupted returns overwrite known answers
- Override rate, meaning corrupted content replaces an answer the model got right without tools, was 56.4% for search.
- GPT models score 85.2–93.6% alone on code tasks, yet adopted corrupted returns on 49.1–60.2% of items they solved.
- Agents doubt but do not warn
- Reasoning traces often mention a conflict and even the correct value.
- Final answers warned users in only 4.2% of runs (1.5% excluding Muse).
- Verification prompts balance best
- Telling the agent to run one different check on conflicting returns lowered adoption for all three tools.
- Accuracy with correct returns was largely preserved.
Evidence
- Adoption was high for every tool
- Mean P1 (plausible wrong value) adoption was 68.0% for search, 40.1% for sub-agent and 35.5% for code executor.
- Unrelated values (P2) were still adopted at 12.6%, 27.3% and 24.5%.
- Frontier models behave similarly
- On a 90-item FreshQA subset, GPT-5.4, Claude Sonnet 5, Opus 4.8 and Grok 4.6 had P1 adoption of 48.9–59.3%.
- Override rates on items answered correctly without tools were 33.3–40.0%.
- Two corrupted tools crush accuracy
- Accuracy with correct returns was 98.4–98.8%.
- It fell to 19.8–26.2% when both tools were corrupted.
- Prompt interventions (6-model mean vs PLAIN)
- Search P1 adoption fell from 75.4% to 70.0% with VERIFY.
- Code executor fell from 40.2% to 30.4% with 99.9% accuracy.
- COMPARE cut search accuracy from 94.2% to 90.9%.
How to Apply
- Add a VERIFY instruction to your system prompt
- Put it just above the final-answer format of your agent prompt.
- Tell the agent to run one different check when a tool result conflicts with prior knowledge, constraints or independent computation.
- Compare adoption on clean and deliberately corrupted inputs.
- Build a corrupted-tool regression test
- Wrap your search or code tool to alter only the answer-relevant value.
- Track how often the corrupted value appears in the final answer.
- Also track override on items the agent answers correctly without tools.
- Attach Low/High reliability labels to tool results
- If you own the search or RAG tool, add a reliability field and instruct the model to consider it.
- Mark weakly sourced results as Low.
- The effect is partial, so combine it with VERIFY.
- Enforce user warnings in application code
- Do not rely on the model to flag conflicts voluntarily.
Try It
# Paste into a Claude/ChatGPT system prompt or agent config (the paper's VERIFY policy)
You are a helpful assistant that answers factual questions.
You have access to a tool named web_search.
If an answer-bearing search result conflicts with relevant prior knowledge or task constraints, issue one substantively different follow-up query designed to actively seek relevant independent counterevidence. Change the query framing or date context and aim to retrieve a different source; do not simply repeat the original query.
End your response with a line in exactly this format:
FINAL ANSWER: <short answer>
# Question: {{question}}
# Next: build a test where the tool returns a wrong value on purpose, and compare final answers with and without this instruction.Terminology
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Original Abstract (Expand)
LLM agents use tools to access information and perform computations beyond their parametric knowledge. Existing tool-use benchmarks evaluate whether agents select and call the right tools, assuming that tool returns are reliable. However, tools can return plausible but incorrect outputs. We evaluate 14 models with three tools (web search, an LLM sub-agent, and a code executor), corrupting their returns to examine whether agents overrely on unreliable tools. Agents adopt corrupted returns at high rates, with mean adoption exceeding one third for every tool and reaching 68.0% for web search. Corrupted returns also frequently override correct answers that agents give without tools, and this reliance persists in more complex tasks and in tasks that combine multiple tools. Agents often make more tool calls under corrupted returns, and reasoning traces show them questioning a return and even stating the correct answer. Nevertheless, they still pass the corrupted content to users, rarely warning them of the conflict. We further test interventions spanning prompts, tool metadata, post-training, and activation steering. Verification prompts reduce adoption across all three tools while largely preserving accuracy with correct returns, and reliability labels provide partial mitigation in web search. The tested post-training methods offer limited gains, and the effect of activation steering depends on the model and intervention strength. Overall, our findings provide a basis for diagnosing tool overreliance and for developing agents that assess tool returns rather than assuming their reliability.